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Abstract
The paper shows that the post earnings announcement drift is stronger for conglomerates,
despite conglomerates being larger, more liquid, and more actively researched by investors.
We attribute this nding to slower information processing about complex rms and show
that the post earnings announcement drift is positively related to measures of conglomerate
complexity. We also nd that the post earnings announcement drift is stronger for new
conglomerates than it is for existing conglomerates and that investors are most confused
about complicated rms that expand from within rather than rms that diversify into new
business segments via mergers and acquisitions.
JEL Classication: D83, G12, G14, M40
Keywords: post-earnings-announcement drift, conglomerates, mispricing, limits to
arbitrage, complicated rms
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Cohen and Lou (2012) nd that investors take longer to process value-
relevant information about conglomerates. In particular, Cohen and Lou nd that pseudo-
conglomerate returns signicantly predict the returns to the real conglomerates one month
ahead, which indicates that conglomerates take an extra month to incorporate industry-
wide shocks into their prices.2
We take a dierent approach in relating rm complexity to the speed of information
processing by considering complexity as a limits-to-arbitrage variable. We hypothesize that
complex rms (conglomerates) should have stronger post-earnings-announcement drifts
(PEAD). We use three measures of complexity - a dummy variable for conglomerates, the
number of business segments, and sales concentration based on the Herndahl index - and
nd in cross-sectional regressions that PEAD is twice as strong for complex rms as it is
for single-segment rms.
Stronger PEAD for more complex rms is a surprising result, because rm complexity is
positively related to size. Furthermore, complex rms are more liquid, are less volatile and
have better coverage by nancial analysts and institutions. Unless rm complexity severely
hampers the ability of investors to process information, one should expect to nd weaker,
not stronger post-earnings-announcement drifts for complex rms, because all other rm
characteristics suggest that complex rms should have lower limits to arbitrage. We verify
in the data that conglomerates indeed have lower limits to arbitrage, and controlling
for the relation between PEAD and limits to arbitrage, the relation between PEAD and
complexity becomes even stronger.
2For each conglomerate rm, a pseudo-conglomerate consists of a portfolio of the conglomerate rm's
segments made up using only stand-alone rms from the respective industries. For each portfolio that
corresponds to a specic segment of the conglomerate rm an equal-weighted return is calculated. Returns
corresponding to each segment are then value-weighted according to that segment's contribution to the
conglomerate rm's total revenues in order to calculate a corresponding pseudo conglomerate return.
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Further analysis of the relation between PEAD and rm complexity reveals that PEAD
increases monotonically with complexity. While we observe a noticeable increase in PEAD
as we go from single-segment rms to even the least complex conglomerates (the ones with
one dominant segment or the ones with only two segments), PEAD increases with com-
plexity in the conglomerate-only sample as well. PEAD in more complex conglomerates
is triple that of the PEAD observed in single-segment rms.
We nd that the relation between PEAD and complexity persists for at least two
months. The duration of the return predictability attributable to PEAD for complex
rms is longer than the duration of the return predictability documented in Cohen and Lou
(2012) which lasts only for one month. We conclude that investors of complex rms have
even greater trouble interpreting earnings-related information than they do interpreting
industry-wide shocks.
While all proxies for limits to arbitrage we consider are negatively related to rm
complexity and therefore cannot explain our nding that PEAD is stronger for complex
rms, it is still possible that complexity (conglomerate status in particular) is related to a
certain unknown variable that also aects the strength of PEAD. In an eort to understand
if investors really have diculty interpreting information related to more complicated rms
we focus on periods during which rm complexity increases. If the level of rm complexity
(conglomerate status) is related to a certain unknown variable that also drives PEAD,
then new conglomerates would likely have little exposure to this variable and one would
expect new conglomerates to have low levels of PEAD. Under our hypothesis, however,
investors should have the greatest confusion when interpreting earnings announcements of
new conglomerates, due to the signicant and recent change in their complexity level.
We show that our hypothesis is correct. First, we verify that PEAD is higher for all
conglomerates by showing that PEAD of existing conglomerates (rms that have been
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conglomerates for more than two years) is twice as strong as the PEAD of single-segment
rms. Second, we show that PEAD is signicantly stronger for new conglomerates than it
is not only for single-segment rms but also for existing conglomerates. Specically we nd
that PEAD for new conglomerates is double that of existing conglomerates and more than
four times that of single-segment rms. To sum up, the increase in complexity (dened
either as an increase in the number of segments or as the change in the conglomerate
status) is associated with a large increase in PEAD, consistent with our hypothesis that it
is rm complexity (and not any other characteristic common to conglomerates) that leads
to stronger PEAD. We also nd that investors are most confused about rms that expand
from within (rms that expand from within are those rms that add new lines of business
without being involved in M&A activity).
Turning to the potential causes of the relation between PEAD and rm complexity,
we rst control for the predictability of conglomerate returns documented in Cohen and
Lou (2012). Indeed, if earnings announcements are pre-dated by relevant news about the
industries the conglomerate operates in and vice versa, pseudo-conglomerate returns could
predict the magnitude of PEAD for conglomerates, and this extra return predictability for
conglomerates might lead to stronger PEADs in the conglomerate subsample. We nd no
evidence of overlap between our result and the Cohen and Lou result.
We also analyze the relation between the earnings announcement eect and complexity
and nd that the sensitivity of the earnings announcement return to earnings surprise is
about 25% stronger for complex rms. We conclude that, per unit of earnings surprise,
earnings announcements of complex rms have more information for investors to digest.
However, the fact that for conglomerates, 25% more information at the announcement
leads to twice as strong PEAD subsequently suggests that investors also have diculty
interpreting information related to complicated rms.
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Finally, we compare the analyst coverage of simple and complex rms in more depth
and nd that rm complexity is detrimental to the quantity and quality of analyst coverage.
Although on average complicated rms have more analyst coverage than single-segment
rms, once we compare multi-segment rms to single-segment rms of similar size, we nd
that complex rms are followed by a smaller number of analysts, these analysts have less
industry expertise and make larger errors in their earnings forecasts. We also document
that in general lower analyst coverage and coverage of lower quality are both associated
with stronger PEAD, a nding that is new to the literature to the best of our knowl-
edge. Controlling for the relation between PEAD and analyst coverage (adjusted for size)
weakens the link between PEAD and rm complexity, which suggests that lower analyst
coverage could be one of the many reasons why complex rms have stronger PEADs. We
document that controlling for the impact of analyst coverage on PEAD can account for at
most 30% of the additional PEAD experienced by complex rms.
We show that up to a half of the additional PEAD experienced by complex rms is
due to two separate but complementary reasons: First, we nd that a unit of SUE carries
more information for complicated rms; second the quantity and quality of the analyst
coverage is much lower for complicated rms. Finally, we conclude that the remaining half
of the additional PEAD experienced by complex rms seems to be purely attributable to
rm complexity per se.
2 Data
We use three measures of rm complexity. The rst measure, Conglo, is the conglomerate
dummy, equal to 1 if the rm is a conglomerate and 0 otherwise. The rm is deemed to be
a conglomerate if it has business divisions in two or more dierent industries, according
to Compustat segment les. Industries are dened using two-digit SIC codes. The second
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measure of complexity, NSeg, is the number of divisions with dierent two-digit SIC codes.
The third measure, Complexity, is a continuous variable based on sales concentration.





i , where sales share, si, for each division is the fraction of total sales
generated by that division. According to the third denition of complexity, a rm with
sales in a single segment would have a Complexity measure of 0, whereas a rm with sales
in a large number of industries could achieve a Complexity score close to 1.
Our measure of PEAD is the slope from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression of cumu-
lative post-announcement returns on earnings surprises. Post-announcement cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) are cumulated between trading day 2 and trading day 60 after
the earnings announcement. CARs are size and book-to-market adjusted following Daniel
et al. (1997) (also known as DGTW). Earnings announcement dates are from COMPUS-
TAT, and daily returns are from CRSP daily les.
We measure earnings surprise as standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), dened as
the dierence between earnings per share in the current quarter and earnings per share in
the same quarter of the previous year, scaled by the share price for the current quarter.
Since we calculate SUE and PEAD values as in Livnat and Mendenhall (JAR, 2006) we
use the same sample selection criteria. In doing so, we restrict the sample to rm-quarter
observations with price per share greater than $1 as of the end of quarter t in an eort
to reduce noise caused by small SUE deators. We also keep only those observations
with non-negative book value of equity at the end of quarter t-1, while excluding those
observations with market value of equity less than $5 million at the end of quarter t-1 .
Our sample period is determined by the availability of the segment data and lasts from
January 1977 to December 2010.
All other variables are dened in the Data Appendix.
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3 Descriptive Statistics
Our paper uses rm complexity as a new proxy for limits to arbitrage. This challenges the
established perception about multi-segment rms. Complex rms tend to be larger, more
liquid, less volatile, and more transparent and as such they are expected to have lower
limits to arbitrage. In this section, we empirically verify the relationship between rm
complexity and the traditional measures of limits to arbitrage in an eort to emphasize
the distinctiveness of our measure.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the full distribution of SUE, Complexity=1-HHI, and num-
ber of segments for all rms and for conglomerates only. A few numbers are particularly
noteworthy. First, since our focus is \PEAD per unit of SUE", it is important to note that
SUE changes by 0.139=0.064-(-0.075) between the 95th and the 5th percentiles and by
0.273=0.129-(-0.145) between the 97.5th and the 2.5th SUE percentiles. Thus \PEAD per
unit of SUE" has to be divided by 7 to measure the spread in CARs between rms with
SUEs in the 95th and the 5th percentiles, suggesting that the spread in CARs between
rms with SUEs in the 97.5th and the 2.5th percentiles will be roughly double that.
Second, we notice that most rms in our sample are not conglomerates (the median
number of segments in the full sample is 1) and most conglomerates have two segments
(the median number of segments for conglomerates is 2 except for a few years early in
the sample).3 A relatively large number of conglomerates report three segments and some
have four segments, whereas conglomerates with ve or more segments make up less than
2.5% of the sample.
Third, the distribution of complexity suggests that there is a signicant number of
low-complexity rms. For example, a two-segment rm where one segment accounts for
3In untabulated results, we nd that 27% of rms in the sample are conglomerates. This number varies
from 47% in the late 1970s to 17% in the late 1990s back to 25% in the 2000s.
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95% of the revenues would have a complexity measure of 0.095. This level of complexity
is comparable to the 10th complexity percentile in our sample which is only 0.079. A two-
segment rm where one segment accounts for 90% of sales has the complexity measure
of 0.18. This level of complexity is comparable to the 25th complexity percentile in the
sample of conglomerates only. These observations suggest that even small segments are
reported in Compustat, and that we are not lumping together single-segment rms with
conglomerates that have a lot of small segments.
The rest of Table 1 compares the rm characteristics of single-segment rms, multi-
segment rms (conglomerates), and all Compustat rms. Multi-segment rms are rms
that have business segments with more than one two-digit SIC code, according to Com-
pustat segment les. Single-segment rms are those rms that are classied in Compustat
segment les and operate in a single industry. \All Compustat rms" in the table does
not refer to the aggregation of single-segment and multi-segment rms, but rather refers
to all rms with non-missing quarterly earnings.4
In Panel B, we summarize earnings surprises (SUE) and announcement returns (CAR(-
1;+1)) for the three types of rms specied as above. CAR(-1;+1) is size and book-to-
market adjusted as in DGTW. Panel B1 reports the mean CAR values, in an attempt
to assess whether conglomerates, on average, have more positive earnings surprises, and
Panel B2 reports the means of absolute values of CAR(-1;+1), testing whether earnings
surprises experienced by conglomerates are dierent in magnitude.
We nd in Panel B that conglomerates experience earnings surprises that are com-
parable to full sample means, but signicantly smaller in magnitude than the earnings
surprises experienced by single-segment rms. Panel B1 reveals that SUEs and announce-
4The number of rms in quarterly Compustat les is about twice as large as the number of rms
reported in Compustat segment les, because single-segment rms and rms with relatively small segments
do not have to report segment data.
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ment CARs of all three rm groups (single-segment, multi segment, all rms) are, on
average, positive at 15.6 bp, 15.5 and 16 bp, respectively, and that conglomerates have
somewhat more positive SUEs, but the dierence is never statistically signicant.
Panel B2 shows that the magnitude of the announcement CARs is signicantly smaller
for conglomerates than it is for single-segment rms or all Compustat rms, whereas the
average absolute magnitude of SUE is similar for all three groups of rms.
Panel C summarizes the median values of several liquidity measures for single-segment
rms, multi-segment rms, and all Compustat rms. The rst three - the Gibbs measure
(Hasbrouck, 2009), the Roll (1984) measure, and the eective spread estimate of Corwin
and Schultz (2012) estimate the eective bid-ask spread. We nd that the bid-ask spread
of a representative conglomerate is roughly one-third to two-thirds lower than the bid-ask
spread of a representative single-segment rm and roughly one-quarter to one-third lower
than the bid-ask spread of a representative Compustat rm.
The fourth liquidity measure, the Amihud (2002) measure, estimates the price impact
and shows that conglomerates experience 50% less price impact when compared to a repre-
sentative single-segment rm and 40% less price impact when compared to a representative
Compustat rm.
The last measure is a catch-all trading cost measure from Lesmond et al. (1999). This
measure calculates the fraction of zero-return days in each rm-year and assumes that
stocks are not traded when the trading costs are higher than the expected prot from
trading. Thus, a greater fraction of zero-return days is synonymous with higher trading
costs. We nd that for conglomerates the median number of zero-return days is 11.8% ,
as opposed to 14.1% for single-segment rms and 13.7% for the full sample (all dierences
are statistically signicant).
In summary, all liquidity measures in Panel C strongly suggest that conglomerates are
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signicantly more liquid than single-segment rms and other rms in Compustat with
missing segment les. Thus, the liquidity measures suggest that if the link between PEAD
and complexity were driven by liquidity eects, then PEAD would be stronger for simpler
rms, contrary to our hypothesis. This observation also suggests that, controlling for the
interaction between PEAD and liquidity should make the relation between PEAD and
complexity economically even more signicant.
In Panel D, we consider several characteristics of the information environment. We nd
that conglomerates have signicantly lower idiosyncratic volatility (dened as the volatility
of Fama-French model residuals) when compared to single-segment rms and other rms
on Compustat, and slightly lower turnover, which can also be interpreted as a measure of
uncertainty. Panel D also shows that a representative conglomerate is twice the size of a
representative single-segment rm, has signicantly larger analyst following and also has
signicantly more institutional ownership.
We conclude that a representative conglomerate enjoys a more transparent informa-
tion environment, receives more attention from investors and is more actively studied when
compared to a representative single-segment rm. Analysis of traditional proxies for liq-
uidity and information transparency suggest that conglomerates should have signicantly
lower limits to arbitrage.
4 Firm Complexity and PEAD
4.1 Complex Firms Have Stronger PEAD
Table 2 presents our main results, as we study the relation between PEAD and rm
complexity. We perform Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with post-announcement cu-
mulative abnormal returns (CAR(2;60)) on the left-hand side and earnings surprise (SUE)
and its interaction with alternative measures of rm complexity on the right-hand side.
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Our measure of PEAD is the (positive) slope on SUE. Higher values of complexity mea-
sures utilized in this study correspond to a higher degree of complexity by construction.
In this context observing a stronger PEAD for complex rms is associated with nding a
positive coecient on the interaction of SUE and complexity.
A caveat is in order: our denition of PEAD is the extra drift per unit of SUE.
Complex rms experience higher levels of PEAD than single-segment rms when both
types of rms are exposed to the same amount of SUE. That does not necessarily imply
that if we divide the sample into two sub-samples composed of simple rms and complex
rms, a straight-forward trading strategy based on PEAD (buying rms in the top SUE
decile while shorting rms in the bottom SUE decile) will be more protable for complex
rms, since complex rms can well have (and do have, see Panel A2 of Table 1) smaller
magnitudes of earnings surprises. However, in order to understand whether investors take
longer to process the same amount of information when they are confronted with more
complex rms, one should compare PEAD per comparable units of earnings surprise. 5
The literature on price momentum (see, e.g., Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, Lesmond et
al., 2004, Zhang, 2006, and others) nds a puzzling absence of momentum for microcaps
(stocks in the lowest NYSE/AMEX market cap quintile). Consequently, all results that
momentum is stronger for rms with higher limits to arbitrage hold only in the sample
with microcaps excluded. Since PEAD and price momentum are two related anomalies,
we choose to exclude microcaps from our analysis as well. Another benet of excluding
microcaps is that microcaps are dominated by single-segment rms, and our regression
analysis that compares PEAD for single-segment rms and conglomerates would have
virtually no basis for such a comparison among microcaps.6
5A stronger PEAD per unit of SUE in cross-sectional regressions also implies a protable trading
strategy, as described in Fama (1976), who shows in Chapter 9 that slopes from Fama-MacBeth regressions
are returns to tradable, albeit relatively dicult to construct portfolios.
6Table 3, discussed in the next subsection, presents, among other things, our main results with small
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The rst column in Table 2 estimates PEAD in the pairwise regression of CAR(2;60)
on SUE. The regression estimates that the dierence in SUE between the 95th and the
5th (97.5th and 2.5th) SUE percentiles implies a CAR of 1.64% (3.23%) in the three
months following the announcement. The second column adds the Amihud measure and
its interaction with SUE. We nd that PEAD is signicantly stronger for rms with higher
values of the Amihud measure (rms with higher price impact).7
In the third column, we perform the rst test of our main hypothesis by regressing
CARs on SUE, the conglomerate dummy, and the interaction of SUE and the conglomerate
dummy. The interaction of the conglomerate dummy and SUE is highly signicant and
suggests that for conglomerates PEAD is 2.3% (1.17%) greater per three months than it is
for single-segment rms when we estimate the dierence in the PEADs by using the SUE
dierential between the 97.5th and the 2.5th (95th and 5th) SUE percentiles.
The fourth column combines columns two and three and estimates the relation be-
tween PEAD and conglomerate status controlling for the interaction between PEAD and
price impact. We nd that controlling for the product of PEAD and price impact in-
creases the loading on the interaction term between PEAD and the conglomerate dummy
approximately by 25%.
Columns ve and six repeat the analyses conducted in columns three and four, and
replace the conglomerate dummy with the continuous complexity measure, 1-HHI. The
results in columns ve and six are qualitatively similar to the results in columns three
and four: more complex rms have signicantly stronger PEAD per unit of SUE, and this
caps included back into the sample.
7In untabulated results, we tried other measures of trading costs and limits to arbitrage from Panels
B and C of Table 1 and could not nd a reliable relation between PEAD and any of them. However, the
fact that there is no relation between, say, PEAD and size in Fama-MacBeth regressions does not imply
that a PEAD-based trading strategy will not be more protable for small rms, because the regression
measures PEAD as \CAR per unit of SUE", and smaller rms may well (and do) witness more extreme
SUEs.
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relation increases in magnitude when we control for the product of SUE and the Amihud
measure. The magnitude of the coecient on the product of SUE and complexity suggests
that the eect of the interaction term on PEAD is roughly equal to the impact estimated
in columns three and four: the median level of the complexity variable for conglomerates is
about 0.378, thus the slope of 0.184 in column ve would estimate the dierence in PEADs
of a representative single-segment rm and a representative conglomerate at 1.81% (0.94%)
when the SUE dierential between the 97.5th and the 2.5th (95th and 5th) percentiles is
used in the estimation.
Columns seven and eight use the number of segments (with dierent two-digit SIC
codes) as a proxy for complexity. Once again, the interaction term between PEAD and
complexity is statistically signicant even prior to controlling for the confounding eects of
other limits to arbitrage proxies. Furthermore the economic signicance of the interaction
term increases after controlling for the relation between PEAD and price impact, and is
qualitatively similar to the eect documented in columns three to six.
4.2 Degree of Complexity Matters
In Table 3, we test whether more complex conglomerates have stronger PEADs. While
the evidence in Table 2 (columns 5 to 8) suggests that they do, we acknowledge that
both Complexity=1-HHI and NSeg have a huge mass at 0 and 1, respectively, and the
positive relation between those two variables and the strength of PEAD might be solely
attributable to the dierence between conglomerates and single-segment rms.
In Table 3, we get rid of the mass at 0 (or 1) by restricting the sample to conglomerate
rms only and by re-running the regressions from Table 2 in this conglomerate only sample.
8Complexity of 0.37, or HHI=0.63 roughly corresponds to a two-segment rm with one segment taking
slightly over 75% of sales, or to a three-segment rm with one segment taking 78% of sales and the other
two taking 12% and 10% respectively.
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For Table 3 only, we include the rms with market cap below the 20th NYSE/AMEX
size percentile back in the sample for two reasons. First, since we are restricting our
attention to conglomerates only, we are no longer worried about the fact that there are
few conglomerates among small rms, a fact that makes comparing single-segment and
conglomerate PEADs in Table 2 more challenging but has no relevance for Table 3. Second,
the number of conglomerates is relatively small (roughly 1000 per year, or a quarter of our
full sample), and the number of conglomerates with non-missing market caps above the
20th NYSE/AMEX size percentile is even smaller, and thus we need all the observations
we can have to make our tests more powerful.
In column one, we re-run the regression from column ve of Table 2 in the full sam-
ple with small rms included and conrm that PEAD is indeed signicantly stronger for
complex rms in this sample. The coecient on the product of SUE and complexity is
expectedly smaller than that in Table 2, but is still both statistically and economically
signicant. The regression coecients suggest that the dierence in PEADs of a represen-
tative conglomerate and a representative single-segment rm is 1.28% .
In column two, we perform the regression from column one using only conglomerates
with complexity below the median. First, we observe that the slope on SUE, which now
measures PEAD for conglomerates with the lowest degree of complexity, is about a third
greater than the slope on SUE in column one, which measures PEAD for single-segment
rms. We conclude that there is indeed a signicant jump in PEAD based upon the
conglomerate status: even the least complicated conglomerates have between 44 and 86
basis points stronger PEAD than single-segment rms.9
Second, the slope on the product of SUE and complexity in column two suggests a
9The estimates were obtained by multiplying the dierence in the slopes in columns 2 and 1, (0:131 
0:099)  100% = 3:2%, by the dierence between the 97.5th and the 2.5th SUE percentiles (0.129-(-
0.145)=0.273). Alternative values are obtained by using the spread between the 95th and the 5th SUE
percentiles (0.064-(-0.075)=0.139). The spreads between SUE percentiles are from Panel A1 of Table 1.
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statistically and economically signicant dierence between the PEADs of conglomerates
with the lowest complexity and the PEADs of conglomerates with median complexity.
Since the median complexity is 0.37 (see Panel A2 in Table 1), the PEAD for conglomerates
with median complexity is more than twice the PEAD for conglomerates with the lowest
complexity. For example, plugging in the spread in SUE between the 95th and the 5th
percentiles, we estimate the PEAD for conglomerates with the lowest complexity at 1.82%,
and the PEAD for conglomerates with median complexity at 4.11% (both gures are
abnormal returns over three months, or 59 trading days, after the earnings announcement).
In column three, we re-estimate the same regression only for conglomerates with com-
plexity above the median and observe that the relation between PEAD and complexity
has almost the same strength in this sub-sample as in column two, which deals with low-
complexity conglomerates.
In column four, we use an alternative approach to measuring the relation between
PEAD and the degree of complexity. We create two dummy variables: one for con-
glomerates with complexity measures below the median (CompLow) and another for con-
glomerates with complexity measures above the median (CompHigh). The slopes on the
interactions of the dummy variables with the SUE variable estimate the additional PEAD
experienced by low-complexity and high-complexity conglomerates respectively as com-
pared to single-segment rms. The coecients suggest that PEAD is roughly 1.5% (per
three months) stronger for low-complexity rms than it is for single-segment rms and an
additional 1.5% stronger for high-complexity rms.
In the next three columns, we utilize the number of segments (NSeg) as an alternative
measure of complexity. In the fth column of Table 3, we repeat our baseline regression
utilizing the number of segments as our measure of complexity (similar to column seven
of Table 2) in the conglomerate-only sample that includes the smallest conglomerates. In
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the fth column of Table 3, we observe a somewhat weaker, but still statistically and eco-
nomically signicant relation between the strength of PEAD and the number of segments
and conclude that this relation is robust to including the smallest conglomerates into the
sample.10
Since the median number of segments for conglomerate rms is two, we cannot analyze
the interaction of PEAD and complexity separately for low- and high-complexity rms by
equating complexity to the number of segments (low-complexity group would then have
no variation in complexity, since all rms with the number of segments below the median
have two segments). Therefore, in column six we repeat the regression from column ve
for all multi-segment rms. We nd that the relation between PEAD and the number of
segments remains economically signicant, but loses statistical signicance.
On the surface, column six seems to suggest that the relation between PEAD and
number of segments in the full sample is attributable primarily to the fact that NSeg
variable has a mass at one, and that while conglomerates are dierent from single-segment
rms in terms of PEAD, two-segment rms are not that dierent from four (or more)
segment rms in this regard. However, further analysis reveals that, rst, the problem
of \mass at the lowest value" is not alleviated by excluding single-segment rms, since
two-segment conglomerates are as numerous as all other conglomerates, three-segment
conglomerates are as numerous as four-and-more-segment conglomerates, etc., and second,
that conglomerates with more than ve segments add more noise than information.
Analysis conducted in column seven of Table 3 improves our understanding of the
impact of the degree of rm complexity on PEAD in the conglomerate only sample. We
10The slope on the product of SUE and NSeg in column ve of Table 3 suggests that PEAD increases
by 0.5% to 1% per each additional segment in the conglomerate only sample which includes the smallest
conglomerates. The impact of additional business segments on PEAD is smaller in the conglomerate only
sample as PEAD increases between 0.67% and 1.32% for every additional segment in the sample that
includes single segment rms (but excludes the smallest size quintile), as evidenced in column seven of
Table 2.
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construct two dummies, one for two-segment conglomerates (SegLow), and one for all
other conglomerates (SegHigh). The use of these dummies eliminates the assumption
that the dierence in PEAD between two- and three-segment rms will be the same as
the dierence in PEAD between seven- and eight-segment rms. Furthermore the use of
SegLow and SegHigh dummies also allows us to treat two-segment rms as a separate
class, since two-segment conglomerates are as numerous as all other conglomerates put
together.
The estimates in column seven provide strong evidence that single-segment rms have
lower PEADs than two-segment rms, and two-segment rms have lower PEADs than
rms with more than two segments, as the coecients on the interaction terms of SUE
with both dummies are economically large and statistically signicant. Using the spread
in SUE between the 95th and the 5th percentiles, we can use the coecients in column
seven to estimate PEAD at 1.31% (per three months) for single-segment rms, 2.32% for
two-segment rms, and 3.55% for rms with more than two segments. Looking at the
spread in SUE between the 97.5th and the 2.5th percentiles will roughly double those
estimates.
To sum up, Table 3 presents evidence that PEAD is stronger for more complex con-
glomerates than for less complex conglomerates, and hence the relation between PEAD
and complexity is richer than just the link between PEAD and the conglomerate status.
We nd that PEAD increases roughly monotonically as the complexity of a conglomerate
increases.
4.3 PEAD and Complexity in Event Time
Cohen and Lou (2012) nd that returns to pseudo-conglomerates, made up of single-
segment rms, predict the returns to conglomerates in the next month and conclude that
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rm complexity slows down investors' reaction to industry-wide news. The industry-wide
news is rst reected in the prices of simple rms and then the prices of complicated rms
move in the same direction. Cohen and Lou nd that the predictability is limited to only
one month: it takes the investors in complicated rms only one extra month to process the
industry-wide shocks and set the prices of conglomerates roughly right, or at least make
them unpredictable using returns to single-segment rms.
As this paper shows, earnings-related information is another type of information in-
vestors in conglomerates have trouble digesting. Thus, it is interesting to nd out whether
reacting to earnings related information also takes investors in multi-segment rms a
month, as in the related example documented in Cohen and Lou, or longer.
To this end, in Table 4 we disaggregate post-announcement CARs into three pieces -
CAR(2;20), CAR(21;40), and CAR(41;60) - each approximately a month long and re-run
the regressions from Table 2 for each subperiod CAR separately.
The rst column of Table 4 repeats our main analysis in Table 2. The next three
columns conducts the same regression, by utilizing alternative complexity measures. Each
column is labeled with the complexity measure used in that column. We nd that the
dependence of PEAD on rm complexity stays visible for two months, being, if anything,
stronger in the second month. In the third month, the interaction between SUE and
complexity loses statistical signicance, while remaining economically signicant. On the
other hand, in the third month, PEAD is insignicant for single-segment rms, too, and
the (point estimate of the) ratio of PEAD for simple and complicated rms does not seem
to change much with time.
We conclude therefore that it takes investors in complicated rms longer to process
earnings related information than it takes them to process industry-wide shocks studied
by Cohen and Lou (2012). The dierence in PEADs between simple and complicated rms
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lasts for at least two months.
4.4 New Conglomerates Have Stronger PEAD than Old Ones
While all proxies for limits to arbitrage we considered are negatively related to complexity
and therefore cannot explain our nding that PEAD is stronger for complex rms, it is
still possible that complexity and conglomerate status in particular are related to a certain
unknown variable that in turn aects the strength of PEAD.
In an eort to understand if investors really have diculty interpreting information
related to more complicated rms we focus on periods during which rm complexity in-
creases. If the level of rm complexity (conglomerate status) is related to a certain un-
known variable that also drives PEAD, then new conglomerates would likely have little
exposure to this variable and one would expect new conglomerates to have low levels of
PEAD. Under our hypothesis, however, investors should have the greatest confusion when
interpreting earnings announcements of new conglomerates, due to the signicant and
recent change to their complexity level.
In Panel A of Table 5, we use a dummy variable for the change in the conglomerate
status called NewConglo. NewConglo is set to one in the year after the rm switches from
having one segment to having more than a single segment, continues to be one for another
year, and becomes zero afterwards. NewConglo is also zero in all years when the rm has
only one segment. In an average year, we have about 5,000 rms with segment data, about
1,300 conglomerates, and 120-200 new conglomerates, for which NewConglo is 1. Thus,
new conglomerates comprise 2.5-4% of our sample and 10-15% of all conglomerates.
The rst column of Panel A presents our baseline regression from column three of
Table 2 (post-announcement CAR on SUE, the Conglo dummy, and the product of SUE
and Conglo) with the NewConglo dummy and its interaction with SUE added. The slope
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on the product of SUE and NewConglo estimates the extra PEAD experienced by new
conglomerates as compared to existing conglomerates, since Conglo is, by construction,
always 1 when NewConglo is 1.
We make two important observations based on the analysis conducted in the rst
column of Panel A in Table 5. First, PEAD experienced by existing conglomerates (rms
that have been conglomerates for more than two years) is more than twice the PEAD
experienced by single-segment rms. The regression estimates suggest that PEAD is 1.1%
(per three months after the announcement) for single-segment rms and 2.5% for existing
conglomerates when we use the dierence between the 95th and the 5th percentiles of
SUE to calculate dierences in PEAD.11 We conclude that controlling for the eect of new
conglomerates does not reduce the signicance of the interaction term between PEAD and
the conglomerate dummy. The interaction term is as strong as it is in Table 2, which
suggests that stronger PEADs for more complex rms cannot be attributed to rms that
recently have become conglomerates.
Second, we do nd that PEAD is signicantly stronger for new conglomerates than
it is for single-segment rms as well as it is for existing conglomerates. The product of
SUE and NewConglo dummy is statistically signicant and its coecient implies that
for new conglomerates PEAD is 4.7% per three months, almost double that of existing
conglomerates and more than four times that of single-segment rms.
How are new conglomerates created? In roughly two-thirds of the cases, we are able
to trace the increase in the number of segments to M&A activity using SDC data. In the
other one-third of the cases it appears that the rm expands from within, starting a new
line of business on its own.
11The estimates of PEAD would be roughly twice in magnitude for both single-segment rms and
existing conglomerates if we instead use the dierence between the 97.5th and the 2.5th percentiles of
SUE.
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In the next two columns of Panel A we try to estimate the PEADs of new conglomerates
formed through acquisitions (we replace NewConglo with NewCongloM&A, which equals
one only if the change in the conglomerate status can be attributed to a merger with a rm
from a dierent two-digit SIC code on SDC) and the PEADs of new conglomerates created
from within (replacing NewConglo with NewCongloNoM&A, which equals one only if the
change in the conglomerate status cannot be traced back to a corresponding merger).
We do not have a strong prior regarding whether becoming a new conglomerate through
M&A activity or via expansion from within leads to more confusion on the part of investors.
On the one hand, the segment added through M&A activity is more likely to be completely
new to the rm (whereas the new line of business could have been developing within the
rm for several years before the rm starts reporting it as a separate segment) and rms
may prefer to expand through M&A activity when venturing into more \distant" indus-
tries. These considerations would suggest that stronger PEADs for new conglomerates
would be more attributable to new conglomerates formed through M&A activity. On the
other hand, both the acquirer and the target receive a lot of scrutiny during a merger,
and the target also has a history as a stand-alone rm before the merger. Such scrutiny
and the availability of historical information about the target might suggest that higher
PEADs for new conglomerates might be driven by new conglomerates that are formed via
expansion from within rather than those that are formed through M&A activity.
Panel A strongly supports the latter view. In column two, which singles out new con-
glomerates that are created through mergers, we nd that PEAD is higher only by 0.5%
per three months for these new conglomerates than it is for existing conglomerates (the
dierence, measured by the slope on the product of SUE and NewCongloM&A, is statis-
tically insignicant). In column three though, we focus on new conglomerates that are
created from within (i.e., not through a merger), and we discover a huge dierence in the
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PEADs of these new conglomerates and the PEADs of existing conglomerates. Substitut-
ing the dierence in SUE between the 95th and the 5th percentiles into the regression in
the third column, we estimate the average PEAD for single-segment rms at 1.1% (per
three months after the announcement), the average PEAD of existing conglomerates at
2.3%, and the average PEAD of new conglomerates created from within at a whopping
8.8%. We conclude therefore that the stronger average PEAD for rms that have recently
become conglomerates is attributable primarily to rms that have created a new line of
business from within, without merging with another rm from a dierent industry.
In Panel B, we utilize a dierent measure of increase in complexity: the SegInc dummy
that equals 1 for all rms that experience an increase in the number of segments in the past
two years and zero otherwise (by denition, SegInc is zero for all single-segment rms).
Firms with SegInc=1 include rms with NewConglo=1 as a subset, but some rms with
SegInc=1 are not new conglomerates, they are old conglomerates that have expanded into
yet another industry (for example, a rm that reports three segments in year t and four
segments in years t+1 and t+2 will have SegInc=1 in years t+1 and t+2).
The obvious upside of using SegInc instead of NewConglo is that there are more rms
that experience an increase in the number of segments than those that become new con-
glomerates. In fact, in a representative year, there are on average 180 rms that add a new
segment, while the number of single segment rms that become new conglomerates never
exceeds 100 (the number of rm-years with SegInc(NewConglo)=1 is twice the number of
rms that experience an increase in segments (that become a new conglomerate), because
we track new conglomerates and rms with an increase in the number of segments for two
years). The downside of using SegInc is that adding an extra segment to a three-segment
rm is clearly a less drastic change than turning a single-segment rm into a conglomerate.
In the rst column of Panel B, we regress CAR on SUE, its product with the number
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of segments (NSeg), and its product with SegInc, as well as NSeg and SegInc by them-
selves. We use NSeg rather than the Conglo dummy (used in Panel A), because now we
are comparing not the PEADs of new and old conglomerates, but rather the PEADs of
conglomerates with the same number of segments that have and have not recently expe-
rienced an increase in the number of segments. This is what the slope on the product
of SUE and SegInc measures: the dierence in PEADs between, say, two three-segment
rms, one of which has recently become a three-segment rm (out of a single-segment or
a two-segment rm) and the other that has stayed as a three segment rm for at least two
years.
The rst column of Panel B nds that rms with a recent increase in the number of
segments have signicantly higher PEADs as compared to rms with the same number of
segments that have not experienced a change in their number of segments. Substituting
the dierential between the 95th and the 5th SUE percentiles, we estimate the average
PEAD for a single-segment rm at 1.15% (per three months after the announcement)12,
for a three-segment rm with no recent increase in the number of segments at 2.59%, and
for a three-segment rm that recently added a new segment (or two) in the past two years
at 4.88%. As the regression suggests, the dierence in PEADs between the latter two
types of rms is also statistically signicant with a t-statistic of 2.26.
In the next two columns, we disaggregate segment increase (SegInc=1) events into
two subsets: one group of events attributable to M&A activity (those cases of a rm
adding a segment or several segments that can be traced to M&A activity on SDC) and
a second group of events that are not attributable to such activity, and instead most
likely attributable to adding a new line of business for which the rm deploys its internal
12The regressions in Panel B assume that the slope on SUE equals a+bNSeg+cSegInc, where a is the
slope of the SUE term, b is the slope of the interaction of SUE and NSeg, c is the slope of the interaction
of SUE and SegInc. Hence, the PEAD of single-segment rms is a+ b times the SUE dierential.
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resources. The estimates in the second column suggest that an increase in the number of
segments through M&A has an economically sizeable, but statistically insignicant eect
on PEAD: the dierence in PEAD between two, say, three-segment rms, one of which
added a segment or two through M&A in the past two years and the other one that did not
is 1.31% (per three months after the earnings announcement), with a t-statistic of 0.93.
The third column of Panel B, consistent with the third column of Panel A, shows that
adding segments from within impacts rm complexity more. Comparing two rms with
the same number of segments shows that, the rm that adds a new line of business by
growing from within has a PEAD that is 3.85% greater than the PEAD of the rm which
adds a new line of business through M&A activity.
To sum up, Table 5 strongly suggests that the increase in complexity (dened either
as an increase in the number of segments or as the change in the conglomerate status)
is associated with a large increase in PEAD, consistent with our hypothesis that it is
rm complexity (and not any other characteristic common to conglomerates) that creates
stronger PEAD. We also nd that investors are most confused about rms that expand
from within, i.e. about those rms that add segments without being involved in M&A
activity.
5 Why Do Complex Firms Have Stronger PEAD?
5.1 Firm Complexity and Announcement Eects
One possible explanation of why complex rms have stronger PEAD is that the information
revealed by complex rms on the announcement day takes longer to diuse. If this is the
case, then we should expect to see a smaller response around the announcement date,
followed by a stronger drift. Another explanation would suggest that, per unit of SUE,
more information hits the market on the announcement day in the case of complex rms.
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If this indeed is the case, then for complex rms we should see a stronger response around
the announcement event followed by a stronger drift. Empirically, the rst scenario would
suggest that regressing announcement returns (CAR(-1;+1)) on the interaction of SUE
and rm complexity, would yield a negative coecient, while the second scenario would
imply the opposite result.
In Table 6, we perform Fama-MacBeth regressions of announcement returns (size and
book-to-market adjusted as in DGTW, cumulated over the period from the day before
to the day after the earnings announcement) on SUE, its interaction with the proxy for
complexity (the conglomerate dummy in Panel A, the continuous complexity measure,
1-HHI, in Panel B, and the number of segments in Panel C), its interaction with several
limits to arbitrage variables that are studied in detail in Table 1, as well as the complexity
measure and the limits to arbitrage variable themselves. Following our approach in Table
2, we exclude microcaps (rms with market cap in the lowest NYSE/AMEX size quintile)
from the sample.
We nd that irrespective of the control variables used and the complexity measure uti-
lized, complicated rms have signicantly larger announcement returns. We also show that
the impact of rm complexity on announcement returns is more modest when compared
to the impact of rm complexity on PEAD.13 For example, Panel A suggests that around
the earnings announcement date, for single-segment rms the dierence in announcement
CARs between rms with SUE in the 95th and the 5th percentiles is roughly 1.4% , while
13The two exceptions when the product of SUE and complexity is insignicant are the columns that
control for the product of SUE and the Amihud measure and the product of SUE and institutional
ownership. This is due to sample composition rather than being attributable to the eect of the interaction
between complexity and the Amihud measure (institutional ownership). The subsample of rms with non-
missing institutional ownership as well as the subsample of rms with at least 200 non-missing returns
in a year (needed to compute the Amihud measure) and stock price above $5 are very dierent from
the full sample, and in these subsamples the interaction between rm complexity and the announcement
eect is weak even prior to controlling for the interaction of SUE with the Amihud measure (institutional
ownership).
24
for conglomerates the same dierence in announcement CARs is only slightly greater at
1.8%. We also nd that rms with higher trading costs have stronger announcement ef-
fects (either because they are small and witness extreme SUEs more frequently, or because
more pre-announcement information is pent up in the price due to infrequent trading) and
rms with higher volatility (higher turnover, lower institutional ownership, lower age) have
weaker announcement eects (probably because for these rms information takes longer
to be incorporated into prices).
In untabulated results, we nd that including microcaps back into the sample results in
an even stronger positive relation between the announcement eect and rm complexity,
as well as a stronger interaction between the announcement eect and trading costs or
limits to arbitrage.
The results in Table 6 are consistent with the second scenario of stronger PEADs for
complex rms: for complex rms, a unit of SUE contains more news, probably because
conglomerates are more diversied and less likely to experience large SUEs (as Panel A2
of Table 1 suggests). More news takes longer to digest, which leads to greater PEADs for
complex rms.
Does the evidence in Table 6 undermine our main story that investors nd it more dif-
cult to process the information about complex rms? Could it be that PEAD is stronger
for complex rms only because investors have more information to process (per unit of
SUE)? The answer relies on a careful examination of the magnitudes of the coecients.
Dividing the slope on the interaction term by the slope on the SUE in Panel A, we nd that
the announcement eects are about 25-30% stronger for conglomerates. If higher PEADs
for conglomerates could only be attributed to these complicated rms having more in-
formation per unit of SUE, then PEADs for conglomerates would have also been 25-30%
stronger. Yet, Table 2 clearly shows that PEAD is twice as large for conglomerates as they
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are for single-segment rms. Thus, although investors have more information to digest in
the case of conglomerates, the rate at which they process the information is also much
slower.
5.2 Controlling for Pseudo-Conglomerate Returns
The return predictability documented by Cohen and Lou (2012), though clearly dierent
from our result, can potentially overlap with it in the following way: if the industries
the conglomerate operates in are doing well in month t-1, the conglomerate is more likely
to report good earnings in month t. If the earnings are particularly good, they will be
followed by the post-announcement drift. However, part of this drift, at least in the rst
month (month t), can be explained by good returns to the pseudo-conglomerate in month
t-1. Thus, the predictability documented by Cohen and Lou (2012) can partially explain
why PEAD is stronger for conglomerates.
Our prior is that the overlap between our result and the Cohen and Lou result is not
strong. First, Cohen and Lou show that their predictability of conglomerate returns in
month t using pseudo-conglomerate returns in month t-1 is attributable primarily to the
rst two weeks of month t. Since an average earnings announcement happens in the middle
of the month, it would be fair to say that we will be missing those two weeks most of the
time. Second, the predictability in Cohen and Lou lasts for only one month, whereas the
stronger PEAD for conglomerates lasts for at least two months, as Table 4 shows.
In Table 7, we explicitly control for pseudo-conglomerate returns (PCRet) by adding it
into our main regressions of CARs on SUE, complexity, and the product of SUE and com-
plexity. Following Cohen and Lou, PCRet is computed by rst taking an equal-weighted
average return of all single-segment rms in each two-digit SIC industry, and then, for
each conglomerate, value-weighting the industry returns by the fractions of the segments
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with the same two-digit SIC code that comprise the total sales of the conglomerate.
Since our sample has to include both single-segment rms and conglomerates in order
to compare the PEADs for the two types of rms, we have to substitute an alternative
variable for \PCRet" for single-segment rms. We dene \PCRet" of single-segment rms
as the return to single segment rms in the same industry, thus turning it into a measure
of industry momentum. We also control for in our regressions both PCRet itself and the
interaction of PCRet with the conglomerate dummy, to allow for dierent slopes on it for
single-segment rms and conglomerates.
In the rst column of Table 7, we regress CARs on SUE, PCRet, and PCRet times
the conglomerate dummy. We observe two results. First, controlling for industry momen-
tum in the form of \PCRet" for single-segment rms makes the slope on SUE somewhat
smaller: it declines from 0.118 in the rst column of Table 2 to 0.101 in the rst column
of Table 7. Second, we observe that PCRet itself is signicant, while its product with
the conglomerate dummy has a tiny, insignicant coecient. This evidence implies that
pseudo-conglomerate returns proposed by Cohen and Lou as well as measures of industry
momentum are positively related to CARs.14 Indeed, since PCRet picks up industry mo-
mentum in the single-segment rms subsample and the Cohen and Lou predictability in
the conglomerate subsample, the tiny insignicant coecient on the interaction of PCRet
and the conglomerate dummy suggests that the slopes on PCRet are the same in both
subsamples and the Cohen and Lou predictability for conglomerates is just as strong as
industry momentum for single-segment rms.
The other three columns of Table 7 add to the regression in the rst column a measure
of complexity and its product with SUE. The slopes on the interaction of complexity with
14Strictly speaking, the correct way to estimate industry momentum would be to compute industry
returns using all rms in the industry, including conglomerates. We tried that and found little change in
the slope of \PCRet" for single-segment rms dened this way, which suggests that the average return to
all single-segment rms in an industry is a good enough proxy for the true industry return.
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SUE estimate the additional PEAD experienced by conglomerates. The slopes estimated
after controlling for the predictability documented in Cohen and Lou (2012) are similar in
magnitude to the slopes estimated earlier in Table 2. We conclude that the stronger PEADs
experienced by conglomerates is a separate phenomenon that has no overlap with the
predictability of conglomerate returns using returns to pseudo-conglomerates as suggested
by Cohen and Lou (2012).
5.3 Firm Complexity and Analyst Coverage
If information about conglomerates is harder to process, analysts can be discouraged from
following conglomerates, which, in turn, can lead to stronger PEADs for conglomerates. In
Table 8, we analyze the link between rm complexity and analyst coverage by comparing
single-segment rms and conglomerates across several dimensions. In addition to utilizing
the traditional measure of analyst coverage, the number of analysts following the rm, we
also measure the quality of the coverage by analyzing the number and fraction of specialists
following the rm. An analyst following a rm is categorized as a specialist in that quarter,
if the analyst covers ve or more rms in the same industry in a given quarter (we use both
two-digit and three-digit SIC codes to dene an industry). For a conglomerate, specialists
are dened using the industry aliation of its main segment.
Size potentially has a large confounding eect on the link between rm complexity and
analyst following. While conglomerates are harder to understand due to their complexity,
the benets of understanding conglomerates can be greater due to their larger size. Thus,
in order to assess how complexity impacts analyst coverage, we have to control for size by
comparing conglomerates to single-segment rms of similar size.
In Panel A of Table 8, we dene rm size as its market cap and distribute conglomerates
and single-segment rms into size deciles formed using CRSP breakpoints. While this
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method of controlling for size is imperfect, it turns out powerful enough to elicit that
conglomerates have less analyst coverage and their coverage is of lower quality than that
of single-segment rms. In all size deciles, conglomerates are followed by fewer analysts
and fewer specialists. We also observe that a smaller percentage of analysts covering
conglomerates are specialists. The biggest dierence is in the number of specialists, as
single-segment rms have 25% to 40% higher percentage of specialists. Both the relative
and absolute dierences in the analyst coverage peak in size deciles six to eight, suggesting
that conglomerates which suer from lower quality coverage are relatively large rms and
are not obscure/micro-cap multi-segment rms.
Once we control for size we also nd that conglomerates suer from larger analyst
forecast errors due to the lower quality and the quantity of analyst coverage they receive.
As the second bottom row of Panel A suggests, conglomerates have larger analyst forecast
errors in all size deciles but one (decile two), and the dierence is material: on average,
conglomerates have 15% larger forecast errors compared to single-segment rms controlling
for size. Once again, the dierence is mainly observed in the deciles with the largest
conglomerate population: the dierences in forecast errors are particularly large, in relative
terms, in size deciles seven, nine and ten.
In Panel B1, we control for size in a dierent way: we match each conglomerate to a
single-segment rm with the closest market cap. We observe again, consistent with Panel
A, that conglomerates are followed by 1-2 analysts and specialists less than single-segment
rms of comparable size, which constitutes a dierence of 20-30% in the quality of analyst
coverage. In terms of fraction of specialists, we nd, for example, that on average 70% of
analysts covering a single-segment rm specialize in its three-digit SIC industry, but only
57% of analysts covering a conglomerate specialize in the three-digit SIC industry of its
main segment. All dierences in analyst coverage are highly statistically signicant and
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are observed in the vast majority of quarters.
As a consequence of lower quality analyst coverage, Panel B1 also reports that analyst
forecast error is 19% higher for conglomerates than it is for single-segment rms of the
same size, and the dierence is signicant with a t-statistic of 3.29.
Panel B2 illustrates the importance of controlling for size when comparing analyst
coverage of conglomerates and single-segment rms by removing the size-matching. If we
do not match by size, we nd that conglomerates, due to their larger market cap, are
followed by signicantly more analysts. However, the dierence in specialist coverage is
not signicant prior to controlling for size, and in relative terms, the fraction of specialists
among analysts following conglomerates is still smaller than the same fraction for single-
segment rms even without the size control.
We conclude that while a representative conglomerate is covered by somewhat larger
number of analysts than a representative single-segment rm due to the conglomerate
being much larger, this extra coverage is of poor quality, since it comes primarily from
non-specialists and probably even dilutes the average analyst quality. Controlling for the
confounding eect of size makes the negative relation between rm complexity and the
quality of analyst coverage really stand out: when compared to single-segment rms of
similar size, conglomerates are followed by a fewer number of analysts and specialists, and
those analysts make larger forecast errors.
5.4 Is Analyst Coverage Responsible for Stronger PEAD of Com-
plex Firms?
Stronger PEADs experienced by conglomerates could be attributed to the lower quality
and quantity of the analyst coverage they receive. Lower quality and quantity of analyst
coverage would imply a less transparent information environment for conglomerates, which
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would make complicated rms harder to value and as a result would deter arbitrageurs
from betting against any perceived mispricing of complicated rms. But, can the relatively
lower quality and quantity of analyst coverage of conglomerates fully explain higher PEADs
experienced by complicated rms? Or is there more to rm complexity per se that makes
the rm harder to value?
In an attempt to disentangle the impact of rm complexity on PEAD from the im-
pact of analyst coverage on PEAD, in Table 9, we perform a horse race between these
two alternative sources of PEAD. In doing so, we regress post-announcement CAR on the
interaction of SUE and complexity (the slope on which captures stronger PEAD for com-
plex rms) and the interaction of SUE and the number of analysts/specialists covering the
rm. If dierences in analyst coverage between conglomerates and single-segment rms
drive stronger PEADs for complex rms, then we would expect the slope on the product
of SUE and complexity to diminish drastically once we control for the product of SUE and
the number of analysts/specialists.
Since the analysis in Table 8 shows that controlling for size is critical when comparing
analyst coverage of conglomerates and single-segment rms, in Table 9 we orthogonalize
our alternative measures of analyst coverage with respect to rm size: Every quarter we
regress analyst coverage on size in the full cross-section of rms and denote the residuals
of this regression as our measure of relative / residual analyst coverage.
In column one, we re-estimate our baseline regression of CAR on SUE, rm complexity
(dened as 1-HHI), and the product of SUE and complexity using only the rms for
which we have analyst coverage data. Since the number of specialists covering the rm is
computed using IBES detail les, our sample for Table 9, as well as for Table 8, starts in
January 1984. We nd that in this new sample the relation between PEAD and complexity
is about a third stronger than it is in the full sample.
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In columns two, four, and six of Table 9, we regress CAR on SUE, number of ana-
lysts/specialists and the interaction of SUE with the number of analysts/specialists. We
observe that the product of SUE with all measures of analyst coverage is signicantly
negative, resulting in signicantly stronger PEADs for rms with relatively low analyst
coverage, as expected. The negative relationship between PEAD and analyst coverage
documented in Table 9, to the best of our knowledge, is new to the literature.
Columns three, ve, and seven present the main tests of Table 9. In these columns, we
simultaneously control for both interactions: SUE times complexity and SUE times analyst
coverage. We observe that, consistent with the hypothesis that relatively low analyst
coverage of conglomerates leads to stronger PEADs for complex rms, the slope on the
interaction of SUE and analyst coverage is positive, and economically as well as statistically
highly signicant even after we control for the interaction of SUE and complexity. On the
other hand we nd that the interaction of SUE and complexity becomes visibly smaller
and is sometimes only marginally signicant after we control for the interaction of SUE
and analyst coverage.
Comparing the slopes on SUE times complexity before and after controlling for the
interaction of SUE and analyst coverage, we estimate that only 20% to 30% of the addi-
tional PEAD experienced by complex rms can be accounted for by the lower quality and
quantity of the analyst coverage received by complex rms. This nding is independent
of the measure of analyst coverage utilized, though using three-digit SIC specialists (the
largest and perhaps the most important dierence in the coverage of single-segment rms
and conglomerates) elicits the biggest overlap between SUE times complexity and SUE
times coverage.
In untabulated results, we check whether the overlap between SUE times complexity
and SUE times analyst coverage changes if we use the other two measures of complexity
32
(the conglomerate dummy and the number of segments) and nd that the overlap is roughly
the same no matter which measure of complexity we use.
To sum up, Tables 8 and 9 suggest that the complexity of conglomerates makes them
relatively unattractive targets for analysts to follow. This is especially true for specialist
analysts, who cover rms from the same industry and rely on industry expertise. Thus,
the analyst coverage of complex rms is both relatively thin and of relatively low quality
once we control for size eects. The lower quality of the analyst coverage received by
complex rms is one of the reasons why complex rms have stronger PEADs. Nevertheless,
reduced coverage amount (quality) can account for at most 30% of the additional PEAD
experienced by complex rms. We conclude therefore that there is more to rm complexity
than the dierence in the quality (quantity) of analyst coverage: even when a complex rm
has the same amount and quality of analyst coverage as a single-segment rm of the same
size, the complex rm will still have materially stronger PEAD than its size-and-coverage
matched single-segment peer.
6 Conclusion
We propose using rm complexity, measured alternatively as the conglomerate status, the
number of business segments and the concentration of segment sales, as a new limits to
arbitrage variable. We hypothesize that information about complex rms is harder to
process, and predict therefore that PEAD is stronger for complex rms per unit of SUE.
Firm complexity is an unusual limits to arbitrage variable, because, as we conrm,
complex rms are signicantly larger and their other characteristics, such as trading costs,
volatility, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership, suggest that complex rms should
have lower, not higher limits to arbitrage. Hence, if we nd higher limits to arbitrage for
more complicated rms, we can be sure that this eect is attributable to rm complexity,
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and not some other variable.
We do nd, using cross-sectional regressions, that PEAD per unit of SUE is twice as
large for complex rms as it is for single segment rms. The eect of complexity on PEAD
is even stronger when we control for trading costs. The impact of complexity on PEAD
lasts for at least two months, which leads us to conclude that investors of complex rms
have even more trouble interpreting earnings-related information than they do interpreting
industry-wide shocks (Cohen and Lou (2012) nd that the returns to conglomerates are
predictable using the returns to single-segment rms from the same industry, but this
eect lasts for only one month).
We also nd that the degree of complexity matters: PEAD is not only stronger for
conglomerates than for single-segment rms, but it is also stronger for more complex
conglomerates than for less complex conglomerates. This conclusion holds true irrespective
of the measure of complexity used.
To address the concern that complexity is related to a certain unknown variable that
also aects the strength of PEAD, we reexamine the eect of complexity on PEAD focus-
ing on periods during which rm complexity increases. The analysis provides compelling
evidence that supports our slower-information-processing hypothesis: PEAD is stronger
for new conglomerates than it is for existing conglomerates, and it is also stronger for com-
plicated rms that have recently experienced an increase in the number of segments. We
also nd that investors are most confused about complicated rms that expand from within
rather than rms that diversify into new business segments via mergers and acquisitions.
We investigate whether the dierence in the PEADs of complex and simple rms could
be purely attributed to the dierence in the amount of information revealed by these rms
during earnings announcements. Our analysis suggests that for complex rms, one unit of
SUE generates a stronger return reaction at the earnings announcement. Since extreme
34
values of SUEs are less characteristic of conglomerates, we conclude that a unit of SUE
contains more information for complex rms than it does for single-segment rms. Further
analysis reveals that the return reaction around the announcement date for complex rms
is larger by 25-30%, when compared to single-segment rms. Although the dierence in
announcement returns of complex and single-segment rms suggests that complex rms
release more information per unit of SUE when compared to simple rms, the magnitude
of this dierence in the information content is not large enough to justify almost twice
as large PEAD per unit of SUE experienced by complex rms. Taken together these
results suggest that not only the earnings announcements of conglomerates contain more
news than the earnings announcements of single-segment rms, but also that the rate of
information processing is much slower for conglomerate rms.
We also investigate whether this phenomenon is related to the return predictability
documented in Cohen and Lou (2012). We control for pseudo-conglomerate returns in
our regressions and nd that the interaction between SUE and complexity is unaected,
which means that there is virtually no overlap between the Cohen and Lou result and the
stronger PEADs for conglomerates.
Finally, we entertain the possibility that stronger PEAD for complex rms is due to
the fact that analysts tend to provide less and lower quality coverage for complex rms.
We do nd that conglomerates are followed by a fewer number of analysts compared to
single-segment rms of similar size. The analysts covering conglomerates are also less
likely to have industry expertise and more likely to make larger forecast errors than the
analysts covering single-segment rms. We also document that lower analyst coverage is
associated with stronger PEAD and that controlling for the relation between PEAD and
analyst coverage reduces the impact of complexity on PEAD by about 20-30%.
In summary, our study of the reasons why complex rms have stronger PEAD reaches
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three main conclusions. First, the stronger PEAD for complex rms is independent from
the return predictability documented by Cohen and Lou (2012) and thus represents a
separate case of the impact of rm complexity on stock prices. Second, roughly a quarter
of the relation between PEAD and complexity can be attributed to the fact that a unit
of SUE has more information for complex rms than for simple rms and another quarter
of the relation can be attributed to the relatively low analyst coverage of complex rms
after one controls for size. Third, even after controlling for these alternative explanations,
complexity per se plays an important role as a limits to arbitrage variable.
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A Data Appendix
The variables are arranged in alphabetical order according to the abbreviated variable
name used in the tables.
# An (number of analysts; analyst coverage) { the number of analysts covering
the rm (from IBES detail le).
Amihud (Amihud illiquidity measure) { the average ratio of absolute return to
dollar volume, both from CRSP. The ratio is computed daily and averaged within each
rm{year (rms with less than 200 valid return observations in a year and rms with stock
price less than $5 at the end of the previous year are excluded)
CAR(-1;+1) (announcement return) { size and book-to-market adjusted cumu-
lative daily returns between the day prior to the earnings announcement and the day
after the earnings announcement. Earnings announcement dates are from COMPUSTAT,
daily returns are from CRSP daily les, size and book-to-market adjustment is performed
following Daniel et al. (1997)
CAR(2;60) { size and book-to-market adjusted cumulative daily returns between
the second day after the earnings announcement and the 60th day after the earnings
announcement.
CAR(2;20) (CAR(21;40), CAR(41;60)) { size and book-to-market adjusted cumu-
lative daily returns between the second (21st, 41st) day after the earnings announcement
and the 20th (40th, 60th) day after the earnings announcement.
Complexity (rm complexity) { 1-HHI, where HHI is the Herndahl index com-




i . N is the number of segments (from Compustat
segment les, segments with the same two-digits SIC code are counted as one segment),
si is the fraction of total sales generated by segment i.
Conglo (conglomerate dummy) { 1 if the rm is a conglomerate, 0 otherwise. The
rm is a conglomerate if it has business segments in more than one two-digit SIC industry.
Gibbs (Gibbs measure) { the slope from the regression Pt = a+ cQt, where Pt
is the stock price and Qt is the trade direction indicator. The values of the Gibbs measure
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are taken from the website of Joel Hasbrouck and are available from January 1964 to
December 2009. For more details, please refer to Hasbrouck (2009).
IO (institutional ownership) { the sum of institutional holdings from Thompson
Financial 13F database, divided by the shares outstanding from CRSP. All stocks below
the 20th NYSE/AMEX size percentile are dropped. If the stock is not dropped, appears
on CRSP, but not on Thompson Financial 13Fs, it is assumed to have zero institutional
ownership.
IVol (idiosyncratic volatility) { the standard deviation of residuals from the Fama-
French model, tted to the daily data for each rm-month (at least 15 valid observations
are required).
NewConglo (new conglomerate dummy) { 1 if the rm became a conglomerate
in the past two years (the year of the change in the conglomerate status excluded), zero
otherwise. Single-segment rms always have NewConglo=0.
NSeg (number of segments) { the number of business segments the rm has (from
Compustat segment les). Segments with the same two-digit SIC code are counted as one
segment.
PCRet (pseudo-conglomerate return) { For each conglomerate rm, a pseudo-
conglomerate consists of a portfolio of the conglomerate rm's segments made up using
only stand-alone rms from the respective industries. For each portfolio that corresponds
to a specic segment of the conglomerate rm an equal-weighted return is calculated.
Returns corresponding to each segment are then value weighted according to that segment's
contribution to the conglomerate rm's total revenues in order calculate a corresponding
pseudo conglomerate return.
Res # An, Res # Spec (residual number of analyst/specialists) { the number
of analysts/specialists following the rm orthogonalized to size. The orthogonalization is
performed by running a cross-sectional regression of the number of analysts/specialists on
size in each quarter and taking the residuals.
Roll (Roll measure) { the estimate of eective bid-ask spread, computed as Rollt =
200 pabs(Cov(Rt; Rt 1))
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SegInc (segment increase dummy) { 1 if the rm experienced an increase in the
number of segments in the past two years (the year of the change excluded), zero otherwise.
Single-segment rms always have SegInc=0.
# Spec (number of specialists) { the number of analysts covering the rm who
are specialists in the rm's industry. An analyst is considered a specialist in the rm's
industry if he/she covers at least ve other rms with the same two-digit (# Spec2) or
three-digit (# Spec3) SIC code in the same quarter. For a conglomerate, an analyst is
classied as a specialist based on the industry aliation of the largest segment.
% Spec (percentage of specialists) { the number of specialists following the rm
(# Spec) divided by the number of analysts following the rm (# An).





where Et is the announced earnings per share for the current quarter, Et 4 is the earnings
per share from the same quarter of the previous year, and Pt is the share price for the
current quarter.
Size (market cap) { shares outstanding times price, both from the CRSP monthly
returns le. Size is measured in billion dollars.
Spread - the spread implied by the daily high and low prices. Spread is calculated by




























where HIt (LOt) is the highest (lowest) price of the stock on day t.
Turn (turnover) - monthly dollar trading volume over market capitalization at the
end of the month (both from CRSP), averaged in each rm-year.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Conglomerates, Firm Complexity, and the
Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift
The table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market ad-
justed cumulative returns in the 60 days following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60))
on earnings surprise (SUE) and its interaction with measures of rm complexity and trad-
ing costs. Amihud measures the price impact. Complexity is 1-HHI, where HHI is the
Herndahl index computed using segment sales within a conglomerate: for each segment,
we compute the amount of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the total sales
of the rm and add up the squared fractions to compute HHI. Conglo is the conglomer-
ate dummy, equal to 1 if the rm is a conglomerate and 0 otherwise. Conglomerates are
dened as rms with more than one business segment. NSeg is the number of segments
the rm has. Segments are counted as distinct business units if they can be assigned
to dierent two-digit SIC industries. Denitions of rm characteristics are in the Data
Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The sample
excludes rms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX quintile.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SUE 0.118 0.143 0.095 0.115 0.099 0.123 0.051 0.079
t-stat 4.98 4.62 4.17 3.48 4.36 4.00 1.63 1.70
Amihud -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
t-stat -1.81 -1.90 -1.91 -1.88
SUEAmi 0.320 0.323 0.335 0.326






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. For How Long Does Complexity Impact PEAD?
The table presents results of regressions of CAR on SUE, alternative measures of com-
plexity, and the interactions of SUE with various complexity measures. CAR(N;M) is size
and book-to-market adjusted cumulative daily return between the Nth and Mth days after
the earnings announcement. Complexity variables are described in the header of Table 2
and Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010.
The sample excludes rms with market caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX quintile.
Panel A. Conglomerate Dummy
CAR(2;60) CAR(2;20) CAR(21;40) CAR(41;60)
SUE 0.094 0.030 0.046 0.020
t-stat 4.24 2.60 4.31 1.56
Conglo -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
t-stat -0.74 -1.04 0.22 -1.13
SUECong 0.093 0.030 0.039 0.025
t-stat 3.02 1.79 2.24 1.10
Panel B. Complexity
CAR(2;60) CAR(2;20) CAR(21;40) CAR(41;60)
SUE 0.098 0.030 0.046 0.023
t-stat 4.29 2.65 4.59 1.78
Complexity -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
t-stat -0.92 -1.14 -0.18 -0.85
SUEComp 0.199 0.066 0.097 0.033
t-stat 3.09 1.53 2.69 0.69
Panel C. Number of Segments
CAR(2;60) CAR(2;20) CAR(21;40) CAR(41;60)
SUE 0.051 0.002 0.038 0.014
t-stat 1.78 0.15 2.53 0.67
NSeg -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-stat -0.50 -1.01 0.20 -0.53
SUEN 0.048 0.024 0.013 0.010
t-stat 2.74 2.92 1.62 0.89
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Table 5. Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift
and Changes in Complexity
The table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market
adjusted cumulative returns in the 60 days following earnings announcement (CAR(2;60))
on earnings surprise (SUE), interaction of SUE with alternative measures of rm com-
plexity (Conglo and NSeg), as well as the interaction of SUE with a dummy variable for
newly created conglomerates (NewConglo, Panel A) or a dummy variable for increase in
the number of segments (SegInc). NewConglo (SegInc) is one for two years after a one-
segment rm (any rm) reports an increase in the number of segments and zero otherwise.
Both NewConglo and SegInc are set to zero for all single-segment rms. SUEtimesM&A
(SUEtimesNoM&A) is the interaction of SUE with NewConglo / SegInc for segment in-
creases that can be attributed to diversifying M&A activity (that can not be attributed to
diversifying M&A activity). Denitions for all other rm characteristics are in the Data
Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. The sample period is from January 1977 to December 2010.
Panel A. PEAD and New Conglomerates Panel B. PEAD and New Segments
1 2 3 1 2 3
SUE 0.080 0.080 0.080 SUE 0.031 0.031 0.036
t-stat 4.25 4.25 4.25 t-stat 1.08 1.08 1.30
Conglo -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 NSeg -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
t-stat -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 t-stat -0.62 -0.64 -0.63
NewConglo -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 SegInc -0.006 -0.004 -0.006
t-stat -2.04 -1.35 -1.60 t-stat -2.59 -1.65 -2.07
SUECong 0.100 0.100 0.100 SUENSeg 0.052 0.054 0.048
t-stat 2.91 2.91 2.91 t-stat 2.49 2.64 2.42
SUENew 0.158 SUESegInc 0.164
t-stat 2.13 t-stat 2.26
SUEM&A 0.046 SUEM&A 0.095
t-stat 0.39 t-stat 0.93
SUENoM&A 0.452 SUENoM&A 0.277
t-stat 2.08 t-stat 1.63
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Table 6. Conglomerates, Firm Complexity, and the Earnings
Announcement Reaction
The table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market ad-
justed cumulative returns in the three days around earnings announcements (CAR(-1;+1))
on earnings surprise (SUE) and on the interaction of SUE with measures of rm complex-
ity and other rm characteristics. Complexity is 1-HHI, where HHI is the Herndahl index
computed using segment sales within a conglomerate: for each segment, we compute the
amount of sales generated by that segment as a fraction of the total sales of the rm and
add up the squared fractions to compute HHI. Conglo is the conglomerate dummy, equal
to 1 if the rm is a conglomerate and 0 otherwise. Conglomerates are dened as rms with
more than one business segment. NSeg is the number of segments the rm has. Segments
are counted as distinct business units if they can be assigned to dierent two-digit SIC
industries. Denitions of rm characteristics are in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics
use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The sample
period is from January 1977 to December 2010. The sample excludes rms with market
caps in the lowest NYSE/AMEX quintile.
Panel A. Conglomerate Dummy and Announcement Eects
1 2 3 4 5 6
SUE 0.083 0.084 0.090 0.126 0.103 0.101
t-stat 7.80 9.23 7.91 7.81 7.31 9.83
Conglo 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-stat -0.22 -0.76 0.46 -1.17 0.12 -0.97
SUECong 0.025 0.010 0.026 0.032 0.028 0.027
t-stat 2.38 0.81 2.43 3.06 2.53 2.22
Gibbs Amihud Zero IVol Turn IO
Var -0.147 -0.004 -0.023 -0.124 -0.016 0.006
t-stat -1.94 -2.31 -1.89 -4.54 -3.14 5.57
SUEVar 0.928 0.310 -0.046 -1.467 -0.375 0.040
t-stat 0.71 3.40 -0.41 -3.94 -2.14 1.22
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Panel B. Complexity and Announcement Eects
1 2 3 4 5 6
SUE 0.080 0.079 0.087 0.127 0.102 0.100
t-stat 7.87 8.73 8.25 7.69 7.21 10.21
Complexity -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
t-stat -0.83 -1.63 -0.51 -1.82 -0.82 -1.53
SUEComp 0.073 0.070 0.089 0.086 0.082 0.060
t-stat 2.97 2.18 3.40 3.33 3.06 2.01
Gibbs Amihud Zero IVol Turn IO
Var -0.155 -0.004 -0.023 -0.127 -0.016 0.006
t-stat -2.01 -2.30 -1.91 -4.59 -3.15 5.59
SUEVar 0.896 0.316 -0.028 -1.503 -0.363 0.044
t-stat 0.62 3.53 -0.27 -3.99 -2.07 1.35
Panel C. Number of Segments and Announcement Eects
1 2 3 4 5 6
SUE 0.059 0.071 0.068 0.105 0.082 0.084
t-stat 4.97 4.89 4.95 6.44 5.16 5.92
NSeg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-stat -0.49 -0.93 0.02 -2.19 -0.23 -1.13
SUEN 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.020 0.019 0.016
t-stat 3.12 1.35 2.81 3.44 2.98 2.29
Gibbs Amihud Zero IVol Turn IO
Var -0.155 -0.004 -0.023 -0.126 -0.016 0.006
t-stat -2.03 -2.29 -1.90 -4.54 -3.11 5.55
SUEVar 1.054 0.304 -0.044 -1.497 -0.395 0.042
t-stat 0.78 3.49 -0.39 -4.07 -2.12 1.33
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Table 7. Controlling for Pseudo-Conglomerate Returns
The table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market
adjusted cumulative returns in the 60 days following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60))
on earnings surprise (SUE) and on the interaction of SUE with alternative measures of rm
complexity controlling for pseudo-conglomerate returns (PCRet). PCRet is calculated one
month before the earnings announcement. To compute PCRet, we rst compute equal-
weighted returns to all single-segment rms in an industry (industries are dened based
on the two-digit SIC codes). For a single-segment rm, PCRet is calculated as the return
to other single-segment rms in its two-digit SIC industry. For conglomerates, industry
returns for aliated segments are weighed by the respective sales shares of the business
segments and the weighted average is referred to as PCRet. Complexity variables are
described in the header of Table 2 and in the Data Appendix. The t-statistics use Newey-
West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The sample period is
from January 1977 to December 2010. The sample excludes rms with market caps in the
lowest NYSE/AMEX quintile.
1 2 3 4
SUE 0.101 0.080 0.083 0.035
t-stat 5.10 4.13 4.14 1.22
PCRet 0.057 0.056 0.054 0.054
t-stat 1.88 1.87 1.83 1.81
PCRetCong 0.006 -0.006 0.001 -0.001





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9. Firm Complexity and Analyst Following
The table presents quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of size and book-to-market
adjusted cumulative returns in the 60 days following earnings announcements (CAR(2;60))
on earnings surprise (SUE), interaction of SUE with rm complexity, (1-HHI), and dierent
measures of analyst coverage: number of analysts following the rm (# An) and number of
analysts who are specialists in the industry of the rm (# Spec2 if the industry is dened
using two-digit SIC code and # Spec3 if the industry is dened using three-digit SIC code).
All measures of analyst coverage are orthogonalized with respect to size by running quarter-
by-quarter cross-sectional regressions of respective coverage measure on size and taking the
residuals. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. The sample period is from January 1984 to December 2010.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUE 0.066 0.091 0.083 0.091 0.084 0.092 0.086
t-stat 3.03 4.36 3.86 4.39 3.94 4.45 4.02
Complexity 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003
t-stat 0.03 0.30 0.53 0.59
SUEComp 0.259 0.207 0.186 0.179
t-stat 2.93 2.19 1.88 1.82
Res # An 0.001 0.001
t-stat 1.21 1.10
SUE# An -0.022 -0.021
t-stat -4.71 -4.10
Res # Spec2 0.001 0.001
t-stat 1.50 1.40
SUE# Spec2 -0.020 -0.020
t-stat -3.69 -3.39
Res # Spec3 0.001 0.001
t-stat 1.39 1.33
SUE# Spec3 -0.017 -0.018
t-stat -3.03 -2.84
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